Ruffle, B.J. and A. Wilson. Tat will tell: Tattoos and time preferences
LCERPA Working Paper No. 2017-9, December 2017.
Abstract.
Forty percent of Americans under the age of 40 have at least one tattoo. Yet survey and
experimental evidence suggests that the tattooed are viewed negatively and may face
discrimination in the labor market and in commercial transactions. In view of the potentially
adverse economic consequences of a tattoo, the decision to get one may be regarded as shortsighted
and impulsive. We collect numerous measures of time preferences and impulsivity of
tattooed and non-tattooed subjects and find broad-ranging and robust evidence that those with
tattoos, especially visible ones, are more short-sighted and impulsive than the non-tattooed. Almost
nothing mitigates these results, neither the motive for the tattoo, nor the time contemplated before
getting tattooed, nor the time elapsed since the most recent tattoo. Even the expressed intention to
get a(nother) tattoo predicts increased short-sightedness and helps to pin down the direction of
causality between tattoos and short-sightedness.
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Kaplan, T.R., B.J. Ruffle, and Z. Shtudiner. Cooperation through Coordination in Two Stages
LCERPA Working Paper No. 2017-8, September 2017.
Abstract.
Efficient cooperation often requires coordination, such that exactly one of two players takes
an available action. If the decisions whether to pursue the action are made simultaneously,
then neither or both may acquiesce leading to an inefficient outcome. However,
inefficiency may be reduced if players move sequentially. We test this experimentally by
introducing repeated two-stage versions of such a game where the action is individually
profitable. In one version, players may wait in the first stage to see what their partner did
and then coordinate in the second stage. In another version, sequential decision-making is
imposed by assigning one player to move in stage one and the other in stage two. Although
there are fewer cooperative decisions in the two-stage treatments, we show that overall
subjects coordinate better on efficient cooperation and on avoiding both acquiescing. Yet,
only some pairs actually achieve higher profits, while the least cooperative pairs do worse
in the two-stage games than their single-stage counterparts. For these, rather than
facilitating coordination, the additional stage invites attempts to disguise uncooperative
play, which are met with punishment.
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Morrison, W.G., and J. de Wit. US Open Skies Agreements and Unlevel Playing Fields.
LCERPA Working Paper No. 2017-7, August 2017.
Abstract.
We examine the relationship between ‘Open Skies’ agreements (OSAs) signed between the USA
and various countries or regions on these markets and the absence of a so called
‘level playing field’; i.e. the existence of subsidies and other forms of protection
that advantage one nation’s airlines over those of co-signatories to an OSA. We argue
that under an oligopoly market structure, strategic competition brought about by
OSAs creates incentives to subsidize and/or protect domestic airlines. Such incentives
are maintained or amplified by political lobbying efforts that bias civil aviation
policies towards producer interests over wider measures of economic welfare. We report
on financial aid and policies which have co-evolved along with OSAs and which have
advantaged US airlines during the OSA period and which suggest that unlevel playing
fields have been perpetuated and possibly made more unlevel during the era of OSAs.
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Shiamptanis, C. Austerity Measures: Do they avert solvency crises?
LCERPA Working Paper No. 2017-6, June 2017.
Abstract.
Many countries are adopting austerity measures, whereby governments aggressively
raise taxes, with the hope to dispel future solvency crisis. This paper investigates the
implications of austerity on the likelihood of solvency crisis. We derive the maximum
level of debt consistent with solvency, labelled as the effective fiscal limit on debt, and
we show that its position depends on austerity. We find that countries like Italy that
undergo strict austerity could lower their effective fiscal limit and induce a solvency
crisis in the near future.
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Gkiourkas, E., T. Panagiotidis, and G. Pelloni. Revisiting the Macroeconomic Effects of Labor Reallocation.
LCERPA Working Paper No. 2017-5, June 2017.
Abstract.
We revisit the macroeconomic effects of labor reallocation within the
framework of Campbell and Kuttner (1996). We re-estimate their model,
update the sample, and employ generalized and local impulse response
functions. We confirm that total employment responses to reallocation
shocks remain significant.
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Siklos, P. What Has Publishing Inflation Forecasts Accomplished? Central Banks And Their Competitors.
LCERPA Working Paper No. 2017-4, April 2017.
Lombardi, D., P. Siklos, and S. St.Amand. Government Bond Yields at the Effective Lower Bound: International Evidence.
LCERPA Working Paper No. 2017-3, April 2017.
Wu, Y.W., and C. Liu. Bank CEO inside debt and loan contracting
LCERPA Working Paper No. 2017-2, April 2017.
Abstract.
Contrary to the theoretical prediction that CEOs with large debt-based compensation take lower levels of risk, we find that banks with higher CEO inside debt compensation extend syndicated loans with smaller number of lenders, lower spread, less covenant, and higher maturity. Using two-stage selection models, we reconciled these seemingly counter intuitive results of inside debt leads to less conservative loan contracting terms by incorporating banks selection effect. We find that the mechanism of inside debt limit bank risk-taking in loan contracting is through making loans to safer borrowers in the first place, but not through tighter loan terms. These results are consistent and robust to instrumental variables and structure models that control for the endogeneity of relationships.
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Wu, Y.W., C. Truong, and C. Liu. Lehman Sisters: Female Bank Executives and Risk-Taking
LCERPA Working Paper No. 2017-1, March 2017.
Abstract.
This paper studies the impact of female executives on risk-taking within US banks. An examination of US bank panel data from 2002 to 2010 provides evidence that female executives reduce levels of risk-taking in banks. We also find that a more balanced gender ratio has a greater impact on bank risk-taking than merely with the presence of female executive. The results are robust to alternative specifications of riskiness and instrument variable approach. However, when we only use part of the sample period surrounding the financial crises of 2007-2008, the results do not hold. We interpret the results as suggesting that having female executives and more balanced gender ratios in the executive team reduces bank risk-taking overall. But the risk-reduction becomes less effective during crisis years.
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Daniel, B.C. and C. Shiamptanis. "Predicting
Sovereign Fiscal Crises: High-Debt Developed Countries."
LCERPA Working Paper No. 2015-8, *Updated* March 2017.
Abstract.
Every country has a fiscal limit on debt, beyond which the country's economic and political systems cannot raise taxes and/or reduce spending sufficiently to maintain solvency. We assume fiscal crises are created by insolvency due to fiscal limits, and use historical data on debt and surpluses to explain why countries with similar
debt levels have different crisis experiences. We use values for the maximum historical surplus together with estimates of fiscal feedback rules to estimate debt limits for
each country. Debt limits vary considerably across countries. Defining fiscal space
as the largest increase in debt, for a particular surplus, consistent with solvency, we
separate countries into risk categories based on fiscal space. Greece and Portugal
eroded their fiscal space several years, prior to their fiscal crises, placing them in the
highest risk category and predicting the crises that followed. Canada and Belgium
maintained large enough fiscal space to achieve safe status. Other countries reduced
fiscal space, with three eroding fiscal space in 2014, warning of future crises.
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